Untitled Document
Nepal and Venezuela
For a decade or so, the media has been talking about new color and flower revolutions
with colorful revolutionaries like "orange" ones in Ukraine. But,
after so many sponsored, colored and sanitized revolutions, as additions in
the market of "a series of products deprived of their malignant property:
coffee without caffeine, cream without fat, politics without politics the other
deprived of its otherness" (1), once again we are witnessing
pure-and-simple revolutions and revolutionaries, in Latin America and Asia (and
of course, there are many in the streets of Paris, and among the immigrants
in the US, too). Nepal and Venezuela are two hot centers of pure-and-simple
revolutions.
The parallel between the Nepalese and the Venezuelan movements that I draw
rests upon some of their basic commonalities. There might be people for whom
such comparisons would be outrageous--how can one compare the sophisticated
experiments in Latin America with a violent and uncompromising movement of Nepal?
Although it is not my purpose here to make the Nepalese movement palatable,
but this parallel allows me to expose some of its basic facets.
1. "The Object and the subject of power"
Broadly, I attempt to understand the Nepalese experience as part of the global
struggle for democracy, self-determination and socialism. As I see, both the
Maoist movement in Nepal and the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela (along with
other Latin American movements), evolve as continuous critiques of capitalism
and its political forms, especially formal bourgeois democracy, from the perspective
of the downtrodden classes and communities in the respective countries. The
element of negativity defines the basic unity between them.
In the Americas, there are many "sui generis" laboratories of revolution,
where people in their daily practice of "humanist and cooperative logic"
transform themselves colliding at every step "with the capitalist logic
of profit" and their own exploited existence.(2) In this
daily experience they find their own power and political expression. "Rather
than putting the Venezuelan people asleep in order to enslave by making the
act of voting 'into the beginning and end of democracy,' Chávez wrote
in 1993 that 'sovereign people must transform itself into the object and the
subject of power. This option is not negotiable for revolutionaries.'"(3)
On the other side of the global south, who understands better than the Nepalese,
the farce of voting as "the beginning and end of democracy"? They
also know the various ways in which this farce could be enacted. Each time their
grassroots consciousness become a decisive challenge to the status quo, a newer
version of this farce has been enacted in Nepal to distract them, co-opt a few
representatives, de-popularize policy-making and dissipate whatever energy is
left in the streets.
Even the day, which is celebrated as the "Democracy Day", was the
day when Indians re-instated the Shah Dynasty on the throne with an arrangement
with the Nepali Congress to preempt the radicalization of the uprising in the
countryside. Eight years after that, when the unrest on the unfulfilled promises
seemed simmering again, elections were held in 1959. B.P. Koirala won on the
plank of providing 'land to the tiller'. But in December 1960, King Mahendra
banned all parties for dividing the country and found, on the basis of researches
probably done in the US' universities, that the parliamentary system, being
a foreign creation, was not much in "step with the history and traditions
of the country". The homegrown panchayat 'democracy' institutionalized
the indigenous Hindu hierarchy as a political system with the King on its top
as the reincarnation of Vishnu. Destroying commons, unprecedented commercialization,
uprooting the people and growing unemployment radicalized the youth and forced
the rural poor to self-organize in the 1970s; and the political elite--the royalty,
with the democrats' assent--needed to stage another 'democratic' farce--a referendum
on the panchayat system, with far more ballots than registered votes. Finally,
right at the time when global imperialism was full of expectations for its hegemonic
stability in the late 1980s with the crumbling of East Europe, a new compromise
in Nepal was reached in 1990 to preempt the organized revolutionary tide that
seemed certain.(4)
The history of Modern Nepal is the history of the crisis of democracy, as a
system of "elite decision and public ratification" (5).
The exploited and downtrodden Nepalis have time and again refused to accept
this opiate of voting as "the beginning and end of democracy" and
took the burden of exercising democracy in the streets and in their daily lives.
The Nepali ruling classes and their international sponsors in their desperation
have tried many exotic forms of putting them to sleep in order to control them,
but have repeatedly failed. The Maoist uprising is the longest and most systematic
(in official terms, brutal) attempt by the Nepalese landless, poor peasantry
and the proletarians to transform themselves "into the object and the subject
of power". And thus they refused to be duped.
2. "New Democracy"
As far as the details of what the movements in Nepal and Latin America posit
and the way they posit are concerned, there are definitely many differences.
But then, as Lebowitz tells us,
"We all start from different places in terms of levels of economic development---
and, that clearly affects how much of our initial activity (if we are dependent
upon our own resources) must be devoted to the future. How different, too, are
the situations of societies depending on the strength of their domestic capitalist
classes and oligarchies, their degree of domination by global capitalist forces
and the extent to which they are able to draw upon the support and solidarity
of other societies which have set out on a socialist path. Further, the historical
actors who start us on the way may be quite different in each case. Here, a
highly-organized working class majority (as in the recipe books of previous
centuries), there a peasant army, a vanguard party, a national-liberation bloc
(electoral or armed), army rebels, an anti-poverty alliance and variations too
numerous to name or yet to emerge--- we would be pedantic fools if we insisted
that there is only one way to start the social revolution."(6)
The Maoist movement might seem as a critique of global capitalism from outside
the political economic mainstream--the 'marginal majority' of the peasantry
and the landless. But the 'outside' is not equal to something autonomous from
global capitalism. In fact, on the contrary, in the stage of imperialism, capitalism
flourishes by preserving its diverse stages and even 'pre-capitalism' simultaneously--backwardness
and advancement together. The persistence of the agrarian 'outsiders', as in
Nepal, contributes in stabilizing the global rule of capital by providing a
stable and informal reserve of potential proletarians to be drawn as scums and
blacklegs whenever needed, guardsmen for international security and imperialist
agencies, and peripheries for expansion of the late capitalist economies like
those of India and China. It is in this regard that I find the "instability"
in Nepal, the rise in the democratic aspirations of the Nepalese people and
their struggle for advancement and development as a definite crisis for the
politics of imperialism, for global capitalism in South Asia.
One might object to the above perception by saying that the Maoists have defined
the goal of their struggle as "new democratic", not socialist. Moreover,
a new democratic revolution, classically, intends to complete the 'national'
transformation towards capitalism. But it is important to note the factors that
left this transformation incomplete, and for whose elimination we need a revolution.
Even for Mao who defined "new democracy" in the Chinese context, the
most formidable hurdle in such a transformation in a "semi-colonial"
society was clearly global capitalism that had reached the stage of imperialism
("the invasion of foreign capitalism and the gradual growth of capitalist
elements"). Moreover, for him, "any revolution in a colony or semi-colony
that is directed against imperialism, i.e., against the international bourgeoisie
or international capitalism is no longer a revolution of the old type led by
the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a capitalist society and a state
under bourgeois dictatorship." The 'new democratic revolution' "serves
the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism.
In the course of its progress, there may be a number of further sub-stages,
because of changes on the enemy's side and within the ranks of our allies, but
the fundamental character of the revolution remains unchanged", i.e. it
is "part of the world revolution", which "no longer refers to
the old world revolution, for the old bourgeois world revolution has long been
a thing of the past, it refers to the new world revolution, the socialist world
revolution"(7).
So the immediacies of the 'new democratic revolution' constituting the "sub-stages"
are determined by the task of intensifying the class struggle, which is the
only road towards the "development of socialism". Imperialism or global
capitalism with its 'national' hegemonic nodes peripheralizes and retards economic
development at various locations to stabilize those hegemonies. Any democratic
assertion from below in any form in these peripheries is an assault on imperialism
and its political arrangements. Venezuelan and Nepalese movements are united
in this regard.
Further, after Soviet Union and China succumbed to the political economic exigencies
of international capitalist competition and the politics of "peaceful coexistence",
there was a temporary crisis for the world revolutionary challenge to capitalism.
With the vestiges of official socialism swept aside, the global challenge to
imperialism, the "highest" stage of capitalism, is once again visible,
and only naive journalistic exercises, which fiddle with apparent dissimilarities
and descriptions, will find the linkage between the Venezuelan and Nepalese
movements uncanny. Even the police state of global capital is far more aware
of the underlying unity challenging its hegemony, forcing it to mention the
"demagogue" Chavez, the "anti-American dictator" Castro
and the "vicious" Maoists together in its National Security Strategy
2006.
The dissimilarities between these movements are rooted in diverse "concrete
situations" in which the revolutionaries find themselves. Obviously, as
Michael Lebowitz time and again reminds us, "socialism doesn't drop from
the sky". Venezuela with its tremendous oil assets and relatively higher
level of systematic industrialization and proletarianization, along with its
(counter-)hegemonic relationship with other Latin American countries bestow
on the revolutionaries tasks very distinct from those in the backward, aid-driven
economy of Nepal. But none of these 'concrete' local conditions can undermine
the basic unity and complementary character of these movements in challenging
the "concrete whole" of global capitalism. In fact, what makes the
Venezuelan and Nepalese experiences stand out among the plethora of anti-capitalist,
anti-globalization movements is the definiteness of their goals--the political-economic
self-determination, to create a situation where the laboring majority would
toil to satisfy their "own need for development". As the Latin American
working classes have evolved co-management and asambleas barriales to reclaim
their collectivity and its fruit, the Nepalis for their self-liberation will
need to first destroy the shield of the whole hierarchy of the officialdom and
its privileges fed and armed by foreign aid and ensure a complete agrarian transformation
to reclaim their resources and labor from global capital and its local agencies.
3. The Inside-Outside Dialectic
However, there is an interesting political economic dialectic that operates
in Nepal and Venezuela making these movements mirror images of one another.
Both are engaged in the process of transcending the dichotomy between the 'outside'
and the 'inside' that global capitalism creates for its own expansion. The Maoists
are doing so by forging an alliance with the forces that are struggling 'within'--the
trade unions, other working class organizations and petty bourgeois parties/fronts,
while the Bolivarians are trying to establish a democratic space beyond the
institutionalized framework of bourgeois democracy that subsumes every participatory
initiative into its competitive dungeon.
As mentioned earlier, the loci of Venezuela and Nepal in global political economy
are highly dissimilar, even opposite. Venezuela as a fully capitalist economy
challenges capitalism from within; hence the Bolivarian movement for a complete
social transformation needs to build and sustain apparatuses and institutions
outside the established political and economic paradigms. Co-management and
barrios formed on the participatory principles are the expressions of this 'convex'
need of the movement. As Massimo de Angelis rightly puts, "The "outside"
created by struggles is an outside that emerges from within, a social space
created by virtue of creating relational patterns that are other than and incompatible
with the relational practices of capital"(8).
In Nepal, on the other hand, the six decade-long Nepalese democratic movement
achieved its partial victory in 1990, with the accommodation of the "democrats"
in the power structure, which eventually frustrated the movement's vigor, alienating
its committed vanguards and grassroots--institutionalizing "popular exclusion",
without the semblance of "popular inclusion" that bourgeois parliamentarism
or representative democracy provides for self-legitimacy. Herein lies the root
of the internal instability that has marred the political arrangement of 1990
and the secret of twelve Prime Ministers in thirteen years. In fact, parliamentarism
became Monarchy's instrument of legitimacy.
It was this 'illegitimate' arrangement that provided a ready opportunity for
an independent political mobilization of the 'excluded majority'--mobilization
and dispersal of the movement 'outside'/beyond a few urban centers. The cry
for democracy for "self-determination" reached hitherto
untouched zones of the society, giving birth to the "dual power".
Evidently, it aggravated the crisis in the established hierarchy (broadened
by the 1990 arrangement), which sustained itself and the hegemony of its international
sponsors by such exclusion--sustaining Nepal's peripheral character, as a 'reserve'
for capitalist expansion and accumulation. The Maoists assaulted right at the
middle of the passage, through which the "included minority" leeched
upon the 'excluded'. The consequent internal mutation choked the parasitic political
economic hierarchy. The 1990 arrangement was critically shattered in 2005.
A decade long success of the Maoist movement today has reoriented the aspirations
of the Nepalese petty-bourgeoisie forcing the "democratic" parties
to form an alliance with the revolutionaries against "the autocratic monarchy".
The 12-point agreement between the Maoists and seven parliamentary parties last
year, along with the unilateral ceasefire by the revolutionaries marked the
beginning of a critical phase in the Nepalese democratic struggle, in the struggle
for self-determination. This agreement creates the possibility for an open 'competitive'
struggle (as a manifestation of the deeper class struggle) between democracy
as a mere form or mode of decision-making and democracy as practice or "a
way of people developing in struggle and emerging as a class for itself through
a process of self-transformation" (9). In other words,
it potentially opens the road for a confrontation between the practice of formal
democracy and "insurgent" popular democratic "practice"
based on the collective needs and aspirations of the landless, proletarians
and the poor peasantry that the Maoists have helped in developing and sustaining
in their decade long armed struggle.
In other words, the "outside" is increasingly reclaiming the "inside"--i.e.,
the Nepalese movement is 'concaving' in, seemingly in contrast to the Venezuelan
experience. It is in this dialectic of inside/outside that these movements realize
the complete transformation of the respective societies. Only by transcending
this dichotomous binary can a society comprehensively move "beyond capital".
4. "Sukumbasis" as the protagonists
For many years now, the aid and remittance economies have fed the mainstream
political economic institutions in Nepal. They nurtured a polity based on the
'cut and commission regime', which in turn facilitated these businesses of foreign
aid and legal-illegal human trafficking. They survive on the toil of millions
of exploited and oppressed Nepalis working abroad and for the agencies usurping
the indigenous commons and resources. Internal and international migration has
been a persistent feature of Nepal motivated by immense agrarian inequality,
reinforced further by the commercialization of the local societies through foreign
aid. Industries that were established in the country have been heavily dependent
on foreign capital, especially from India, and do not generate sufficient employment
because of their capital intensity. Of course, 'alternative' industries in service
sector like tourism have definitely flourished, but only the local population
knows what it means to work in this sector heavily based on informal labor with
no security and degenerating exploitation of human beings, not just their labor.
Hence, circular migration across the borders, even beyond the seas, with falling
back on land is a viable option before the Nepali.
Regarding the rural scene, a prominent Nepali political economist, Nanda R
Shrestha says, "Overall, near-landlessness remains prevalent as a permanent
fixture of the Nepali agrarian economy" and outmigration--especially, circular
migration to India--has been an important survival strategy, that helps sustain
"the hill economy in general and the hill near-landless in particular"(10).
However, since the 1970s there has been a remarkable degree of self-organization
among the landless peasants (Sukumbasis), which has been evident in their organized
land encroachments and spontaneous settlements, time and again crushed by the
Shah Regime. It is beyond the class capacity of the petty-bourgeoisie and the
legalist-opportunist politics of petty-bourgeois radicals and democrats, who
generally represent the landed gentry and are ever ready to compromise on any
concession from the royalty, to give a radical turn to this 'new' peasant spontaneity.
However, "the rage simmering under every poor peasant's feet is finally
being ignited by a cadre of unwavering Maoists. Irrespective of political persuasion,
few can deny that this is a fire that can no longer be smothered by the state
and its armed forces no matter how much larger and better-equipped these forces
are in relations to any force that the Maoists can muster with its limited resources.
What looms heavy over Nepal's political horizon, therefore, is the unyielding
question of who the masses will side with--with the forces of fractured democracy,
with the ever-sinister hands of the absolutely dysfunctional royalty, or with
the uncharted territory of the Maoist vision. Maoists derive their power from
the people."(11)
It is evident that the agrarian question which confronts Nepal today and provides
the basis for the Maoist upsurge, once again, puts the Nepalese movement in
line with the great "new peasant movements" (as James Petras describes
them) in Latin America and Africa that decisively threaten 'third world' dependency
and the global capitalist hegemony. In this regard, it is worth noting that
as global capitalism develops, 'unresolved' agrarian question becomes more and
more that of labour, less of capital. As Henry Bernstein tells us, "the
many popular struggles over land today are driven by experiences of the fragmentation
of labour (including losses of relatively stable wage employment in manufacturing
and mining, as well as agriculture), by contestations of class inequality, and
by collective demands and actions for better conditions of living ('survival',
stability of livelihood, economic security), and of which the most dramatic
instances are land invasions and occupations. There is now a revival and restatement
of the significance of struggles over land to the social dynamics and class
politics of the 'South' during the current period of globalization and neo-liberalism."
Referring to James Petras' work on Latin America and Paris Yeros' work on Zimbabwe,
Bernstein concludes, "Contemporary land struggles are significantly different
from the ('classic') peasant movements of the past, and are much more rooted
in the semi-proletarian condition: that of 'a workforce in motion, within rural
areas, across the ruralurban divide, and beyond international boundaries'."(12)
5. "Human beings in all their determinateness"
One may have doubts about the "participatory" element in the Maoist
movement. But this doubt comes from a sterile presupposition and deification
of trans-historical pluralism and democracy. It is important to keep in mind
the class composition of every movement that shapes the character of 'democracy'
and 'participation' in it. The experiences of the peasant movements and struggles
show that democracy from below in a rural setting will come with all its 'violence',
'primitiveness' and 'distortions', devoid of the preconceived urban sophistications.
What is important is the raised political consciousness of the Nepalese landless,
poor peasantry and proletarians, and their active willingness to decide and
build their own future. However, the tension between the participatory element
and its institutionalized alienation in the process of consolidating movemental
gains, which create status quoist interests, is always there, as also with the
Venezuelan experience.
It is well recognized that a fundamental contribution of the Maoist movement
has been to inculcate the issue of self-determination at every level of the
Nepalese society. Even the most vehement critiques of the Maoists recognize
that it is the contribution of these "economic determinists" that
the issues of socio-cultural oppression based on identities, gender, nationalities,
castes have found definite political expressions. As one analyst complains,
the Maoists "were quick to identify" the ethnic discontent in the
Nepalese society and tried "to ride it to their purpose, taking advantage
of the supposed correlation between ethnicity and poverty".(13)
Another notes that the Maoist movement "has also set precedents for alternative
experiences, practices and discourses on gender equality".(14)
Dalit intellectuals, from the communities that are lowest in the caste hierarchy,
find, "Insurgents have raised the economic, social and political issues
of Dalits as well as the issues of women, indigenous people and others".
Further, in "people's war", "Maoists refocused on social intervention
in their stronghold areas. Maoists have initiated a campaign called 'caste integration
and people's awareness campaign' in order to overcome hesitation of non-Dalits
in breaking age-old practices of untouchability. In the Maoist heartland in
Rolpa district, the untouchability and caste discrimination has been reduced.
They have declared 'caste free villages'. They have strictly made villagers
not to practice caste discrimination. The Bista System (in which occupational
Dalit castes receive grain annually for the services they provide to non-Dalit
households), considering it an economical exploitation as well as a way of maintaining
feudal relations of domination and subordination, has been transformed into
daily remuneration for labor, which is now the norm in the Maoist base areas".(15)
Since its inception, the Maoist movement in Nepal understood the fact that,
"While no one liberates himself by his own efforts alone, neither is he
liberated by others."(16) The Maoists facilitated the
creation of a definite space for solidaristic praxis where these autonomous
ethnic, gender and community-level struggles for self-determination could coordinate
their liberatory praxes. The active participation of the oppressed identities
in "people's war" has armed their identity assertion, their aspiration
for self-dignity and freedom against a brutally oppressive Hindu hierarchy.
In its turn, the 'reflective participation' of these entities has strengthened
the support base of the Maoist movement.
However, this identity of the oppressed and exploited in diverse social relations
with a class movement derives from the basic fact that this class of proletarians
and semi-proletarians are "human beings in all their determinateness".
Hence their complete liberation requires liberation from all forms of oppression
and exploitation. The unity between dalit, women, national and other liberation
movements is the laboring majority's self-assertion as human beings. It means
that they are fully aware of the secret through which the global capitalist
class, directly or indirectly, maintains its power, i.e., by the 'parcelisation'
of their 'selves' according to sex, age, race and nationality, among other aspects.(17)
In "participatory" experiences of both countries--Nepal and Venezuela,
despite differences in the levels of sophistication (due to the differences
in the "levels of economic development"), the element of force or
"coercion" is important. In the case of Venezuela, it is provided
by the 'transitional' State, while in Nepal, it is the 'provisional' state,
constituted by the Maoists, that stands in the background of those experiences.
However, arbitrariness is the price of the provisional and the insurgent nature
of the 'force' in Nepal. But post-2001 developments demonstrate that the Maoists
are fully aware of this problem, and their internal debates and readiness to
form an alliance with other 'forces' are indicative of their efforts to transcend
it. It will be interesting to see if their resistance against the local representatives
of the extraordinarily dense and widespread imperialist network of relationships
and connections will bear any immediate success. Or, will global hegemonies
and their agencies succeed in buying a compromise and betrayal that the Nepalese
people have seen so many times in their struggles for self-determination?
Pratyush Chandra can be reached at: ch.pratyush@gmail.com
References:
(1) Slavoj Zizek (2004), 'A
Cup of Decaf Reality',
(2) 'In the
laboratory of a revolution': Interview with Marta Harnecker, Venezuela Analysis,
Sep 22, 2005,
(3) Michael Lebowitz (2006), BUILD IT NOW: SOCIALISM FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, Monthly Review Press, forthcoming
(4) For an interpretation of the political history of Nepal,
see my short
articles--'Pre-1990 "Democratic" Experiments in Nepal and The
Evolving Pattern' (August 2005) and 'The 12-point Agreement and the Future of
Democracy in Nepal' (December 2005)
(5) Noam Chomsky (1987), ON POWER AND IDEOLOGY: THE MANAGUA
LECTURES, South End Press
(6) Michael Lebowitz (2006), op cit
(7) Mao tse-Tung (1940), 'On New Democracy', Selected Works
Vol. 2, Peking
(8) De Angelis, Massimo (2006), 'Enclosures, Commons and the
"Outside"', University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society Colloquium
on the Economy, Society and Nature, Durban
(9) 'Completing
Marx's Project': Interview with Michael Lebowitz, Weekly Worker 608, January
19 2006,
(10) Nanda R. Shrestha (2001), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND,
LANDLESSNESS AND MIGRATION IN NEPAL, Nirala, New Delhi. (New edition of 'Landlessness
and Migration in Nepal', West View Press, 1990)
(11) Ibid.
(12) Henry Bernstein (2004), ''Changing Before Our Very Eyes':
Agrarian Questions and the Politics of Land in Capitalism Today', Journal of
Agrarian Change, Vol. 4 Nos. 1 & 2.
(13) Deepak Thapa (2001), 'Day
of the Maoist', Himal South Asian, Vol 14 No 5,
(14) Mandira Sharma & Dinesh Prasain (2004), 'Gender Dimensions
of the People's War: Some Reflections on the Experience of Rural Women', in
Michael Hutt (ed) HIMALAYAN PEOPLE'S WAR: NEPAL'S MAOIST REBELLION, Indiana
University Press.
(15) Tej Sunar (2006), 'Fighting
Caste Discrimination in the Context of Conflict in Nepal', DNF, available
at
(16) Paulo Freire (1993), PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED, Continuum
Books, New York.
(17) Michael Lebowitz (2003), BEYOND CAPITAL: MARX'S POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE WORKING CLASS, 2nd Edition, Palgrave.