Untitled Document
USAID and Haiti
On the ground United States foreign assistance projects often mean desperately
needed food and employment for the poor, impossible to resist, difficult to
critique. But from the vantage point of US foreign policy objectives a very
different picture emerges and long-term and global outcomes often differ dramatically
from the immediate consequences of relief efforts.
The United States International Development Agency (USAID) emerged as an arm
of US foreign policy following the Second World War. The Agency was developed
to provide foreign relief and development assistance in accordance with US policy
objectives. According to the USAID website (www.usaid.gov) the organization
operates under the following mandate.
"U.S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering
America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets
while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world."
This dual mandate raises the important question of whether US policy interests
generally result in improved living conditions for the majority of the world's
poor? While it may occasionally be the case that the interests of the US government
and the poverty stricken citizens around the world are aligned, more often than
not, US economic and political interests are dependent on the exploitation and
manipulation of workers and consumers in the developing world. It is this inherent
contradiction within the USAID mandate that should cause skepticism among US
taxpayers concerned with issues of social justice and self determination.
The fundamental problem with USAID's stated objectives is that it is not in
the national interests of the US government to promote self sufficiency in developing
countries. US economic interests are fed by foreign dependency on US imports
and loans. Political interests are served by maintaining an economic stranglehold
on foreign governments, and many a strategic alliance has been forged out of
economic necessity. Among USAID's operating tenets are sustainability and local
capacity building, noble goals but highly dependent on how these tenets are
defined and the manner in which they are implemented. Sustainability of what,
and which local capacities are being supported? Implementation is primarily
shaped by another of USAID's governing tenets, selectivity, the allocation of
resources based on foreign policy interests.
The recently released USAID Haiti Field Report provides an excellent case study
for investigating the role of USAID in promoting US foreign policy objectives
under the friendly guise of aid. Much of USAID's current work in Haiti is carried
out under the umbrella of the Haiti Transition Initiative (HTI), a program developed
by USAID's Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) in May 2004 to "emphasize
stability-building measures in key crisis spots."
The OTI was created within USAID in 1994 "to provide fast, flexible, short-term
assistance to take advantage of windows of opportunity to build democracy and
peace" in countries experiencing political turmoil. According to the OTI
website the organization accomplishes its objectives by specifically encouraging
"a culture of risk-taking, political orientation, and swift response among
its staff and partners." The Haiti Field Report explores how short term
assistance programs provided within a culture of political orientation can be
used to distort international perceptions of Haiti's complicated political terrain,
as the elections approach.
The United States is primarily concerned with Haiti's upcoming elections occurring
on schedule, so that a new government can be in place by February 2006. In Haiti,
as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the timeliness and appearance of legitimacy of the
electoral process are of paramount importance for the Bush Administration's
PR machine, which tends to equate elections with democracy, boasting that the
United States is benevolently promoting "democracies" around the world.
USAID describes their objectives as follows: "Haiti's future depends on
elections that are considered free and fair to ensure the legitimacy of the
new government and enhance their ability to govern effectively. The stabilization
of the political and security environment in Haiti is central to U.S. foreign
policy and USAID objectives."
What sort of democracy is the United States promoting in Haiti, where the duly
elected president was spirited away on a US military jet against his will, as
the country once again fell into the hands of the powerful elite and brutal
former military? Haiti is now governed by a cadre of unelected officials overseen
by Prime Minister Gerard Latortue, a Haitian businessman and former radio show
host that lived in Boca Raton Florida for the 15 years preceding his unconstitutional
rise to office. In direct contradiction to actual events and the laws of the
Haitian Constitution, USAID describes Haiti's unelected Interim Government as
"benefiting from the support of democratic institutions." They further
state that the "political transition" of February 29, 2004 "created
a new environment for collaboration with the Interim Government of Haiti,"
indicating their willingness to work closely with an illegitimate government
accused of numerous human rights abuses over the past year in order to promote
US interests.
USAID's Haiti Field Report, which can be found on the USAID website, presents
a glowing image of US development efforts in this "troubled" country,
through a carefully-crafted compilation of selective facts. In August alone,
USAID invested over 4 million dollars towards projects in Haiti. These projects
include road and canal clean-up projects, terracing of hillsides to prevent
erosion and electricity projects. On the surface it is difficult to criticize
the provision of badly needed clean-up efforts and employment opportunities
and certainly these programs have had benefits within the community. The questions
are: what is the long term viability of these projects, and who are the primary
beneficiaries? A far more detailed on-the-ground investigation would be required
to determine how these programs will differentially benefit various local and
international interests in the short and long term.
Other USAID projects that have more obvious political implications are short
term nutrition and recreational initiatives in "key crisis areas."
The report outlines USAID's strategy for pacifying Haiti's largest political
party, Lavalas through selective distribution of aid resources. In August the
Haiti Transition Initiative set up 26 "Play for Peace" camps in Port
au Prince, Cap Haitien, St. Marc and several other "target" cities.
These camps are designed to provide food and activities to desperately poor
communities; essential services, the importance of which is not in question.
What is questionable is the way in which these camps are used to undermine
existing community programs in an attempt to de-legitimize the demands of the
Lavalas movement in the eyes of the international community. This strategy is
exemplified by USAID's description of their activities in Petit Place Cazeau,
the community that is home to Father Gerard Jean Juste's parish of St. Claire.
Father Jean Juste, illegally imprisoned since July 21, 2005, is a popular priest
and outspoken opponent of the unelected interim government. USAID's Haiti Field
Report describes their activity in Father Jean Juste's neighborhood as follows:
"OTI initiated a Play for Peace summer camp in Petit Place Cazeau, the
Port au Prince stronghold of Lavalas party presidential candidate Father Gerard
Jean Juste. [] The fruits of these efforts were seen during a recent demonstration
attended by 200 people. At the same time that the demonstration was taking
place, 300 people were enjoying the summer camp. It is believed that the camp
prevented the demonstration from being larger and giving greater legitimacy
to the protesters. The coming weeks will see a deepening of OTI activities
in Petit Place Cazeau, where events like the summer camp will become increasingly
important now that Father Jean Juste has been arrested. His imprisonment has
inflamed pro-Lavalas fires in the area and made him a martyr to some Haitians."
This report presents a picture of US aid that is simultaneously disturbing
and refreshingly honest. The fact that the "fruits of these efforts"
are described as the camps' potential to de-legitimize protest as opposed to
their success in providing basic services to the community, speaks volumes to
USAID's primary motivations, motivations which will shape long term outcomes.
USAID is an arm of the US State Department reporting directly to Condoleezza
Rice and their stated objective is to use aid to pursue outcomes desired by
the State Department. In this case the State Department is eager to for the
upcoming elections to appear legitimate as evident in Condoleezza Rice's recent
visit to Haiti in which she stressed the importance of timeliness and legitimacy.
In order for this goal to be achieved it is critical to stifle resistance to
the elections. Resistance is being tackled on two fronts. In the past year,
thousands of former elected officials and community organizers have been imprisoned,
forced into hiding or killed, with many innocent civilians caught in the crossfire.
This overt stifling of dissent is implemented by Haiti's unelected interim government
through the Haitian National Police, a brutal police forced armed by the United
States and under the control of the United Nations.
USAID uses a different tactic for pacifying the poor in Haiti who have been
rightfully outraged by the destruction of their democracy, rise in the cost
of living and ongoing government-sponsored repression. Understanding the level
of desperation in these communities, short term provision of services is used
as a way to draw people away from protesting these conditions with a warm meal.
As people are fed they can be quietly indoctrinated with the notion that these
camps provide an alternative to the "violence" of Lavalas. The provision
of entertainment and meals may provide a temporary alleviation of suffering
but they do nothing to address the underlying causes of that suffering which
are deeply entangled in with the disruption of Haiti's democracy in 2004. A
full stomach will not end the police killings, it will not free the political
prisoners and it will not result in the reestablishment of social programs in
Haiti; but it may give a hungry person a moment of peace. Full stomachs and
soccer are excellent tools for temporarily easing suffering to pacify protest
and give the country the appearance of calm in the run up to the elections but
they are not a sustainable solution to the many problems that prevent these
elections from being free and fair, nor will they promote a democracy that truly
represents that Haitian people. The long term implications of installing an
illegitimate government could far outweigh the short term benefits enjoyed by
those attending the camps.
Other questions about these programs include: how long will these programs
feed the hungry and what is their effect on pre-existing programs in Petit Place
Cazeau, that were not mentioned in the report? Long before USAID initiated the
Play for Peace camps in the neighborhood, Father Jean Juste and the St. Claire
community were providing vocational training classes, recreational activities
and meals to thousands of children in the neighborhood. Now with Father Jean
Juste in prison these programs are at risk. Unlike Father Jean Juste's commitment
to empowering the community, USAIDs stated goal of pacifying political protest
through aid is decidedly a short term strategy, and these camps are not likely
to provide a sustainable source of aid after political objectives have been
met. If USAID were truly interested in improving the lives of poor people they
would support the maintenance of existing programs by joining Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, 29 members of Congress, and over 400 religious leaders in
calling for the release of Father Jean Juste, a cornerstone of many community
development projects in Petit Place Cazeau.
As stated in the document, the coming weeks will see increased expansion of
USAID programs in Petit Place Cazeau and in other key areas like Milot, where
Lavalas remains strong. These developments are of interest not only for those
concerned with US subversion of democracy in Haiti but also to those interested
in understanding USAID's operations throughout the world. This explicit acknowledgement
of the motivations underlying aid in Petit Place Cazeau provides and excellent
case study and these developments deserve ongoing scrutiny. Despite its beneficent
name, USAID is doing what it was designed to do, play off the hunger of the
starving, and the boredom of the unemployed, to further US policy interests.
In Haiti this means propping up and illegitimate foreign government in the face
of massive resistance, a difficult task best carried out through a combination
of violent repression and foreign aid, the friendly face of US imperialism.