Untitled Document
This article appears in the July 22, 2005 issue of Executive Intelligence
Review.
Buried in the news of the July 7 London bombings, and a tepid G-8 Summit in Gleneagles,
Scotland, was another summit that took place in Astana, Kazakstan, on July 5-6.
Heads of state representing six nations—Russia, China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
drew the battle lines in Central Asia urging the United States to announce a timeframe
to fold up its military bases in Central Asia.
The U.S. bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were set up in the Winter of 2001
as support bases to invade Afghanistan and oust the Taliban. SCO members pointed
out in the two-day summit, that since the United States is reporting a decline
in fighting in Afghanistan, the United States must now set a timeframe to remove
its forces from the bases in member states Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
In order not to sound too harsh, Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesman,
Sergei Prikhodko, pointed out that the appeal is not meant to pressure the United
States to pull its troops out immediately. But the statement is a sign of growing
uneasiness with the U.S. ongoing presence in Central Asia, the backyard of both
Russia and China.
It was apparent that the SCO member states have asserted their opposition to
outside interference in internal affairs, especially regarding the recent political
unrest in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the wording of the SCO appeal,
global peace and security will not be found, if one nation is allowed to dominate
international affairs.
A Strong Statement
The statement issued by the SCO was forthright and forceful. Vyacheslav Nikonov,
president of the Moscow-based think-tank known as "Politika," pointed
out to the Voice of America on July 12 that the moves show the organization's
intent to strengthen its role in world affairs.
The Bush Administration, not quite on its toes on these developments, took
time to respond. But when it came, the response was in the form of a confused
denial. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, whose hands are full with
the forthcoming six-nation talks on North Korean nuclear weapons, issued a statement
from Beijing on July 10, rejecting calls for a deadline for U.S. forces to pull
out of bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Although the SCO did not urge the United States to withdraw its bases from
Afghanistan—at least, as of now, on the last day of her visit to China
Secretary Rice said: "The one country that said that the United States
should stay in Afghanistan was Afghanistan."
Response also came from the U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow.
At a press conference in Moscow on July 12 he said that the United States plans
to hold bilateral negotiations with Central Asian governments to discuss the
presence of U.S. bases in that region.
In a clever move ignoring the growing authority of the SCO in the region, Ambassador
Vershbow held on to the importance of bilateral agreements during the press
conference saying, "The government of each country where bases are stationed
should express their concerns individually."
Ignoring the SCO
Ambassador Vershbow, a career diplomat, had served as the U.S. Ambassador to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from January 1998 until July 2001.
As U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Vershbow was centrally
involved in transforming NATO to meet the challenges of the post-cold war era,
including the admission of new members and the development of relations with
Russia through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Earlier in 1991 he was
posted to NATO as U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative and Chargé d'Affaires
of the U.S. Mission. It is evident that he played a major role in getting these
bases set up in Central Asia, in the process of expansion of the NATO outside
of Europe.
It is evident that Ambassador Vershbow is not willing to indulge in swordplay
with the SCO, which contains powerful nations such as Russia and China. He would
prefer to exert pressure on small and weaker nations such as Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan, citing bilateral arrangements. Unfortunately for Vershbow, that,
too, may run into a dead end.
In Kyrgyzstan, where the U.S government-funded National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) played a stellar role in bringing down President Askar Akayev through
a "street uprising against nepotism and corruption," the beneficiary
of the uprising, Kurmanbek Bakiev, who won a landslide victory in the Presidential
election on July 11, also called for the United States to start reducing its
military presence in the country, saying that the situation in Afghanistan had
stabilized.
What is more disturbing for the United States is the souring of its relations
with Uzbekistan, where the United States has another military base. Uzbek President
Islam Karimov, who had been lured by Washington's alleged financial strength
and generosity, was moving away from Russia to forge a strong partnership with
the Bush Administration. But his relationship with Washington came under strain
when the United States called for an international probe into a military crackdown
in May in the town of Andijan, in which many people were killed.
After the U.S. criticism, Uzbek President Islam Karimov quickly reinforced
his authority and placed limits on flights in and out of the U.S. airbase at
Karshi-Khanabad in southern Uzbekistan.
At the SCO summit, Karimov pointedly thanked Russia and China for their support
in the aftermath of the Andijan upheaval, and complained that outside forces
were threatening to "hijack stability and impose their model of development"
on Central Asia. According to one observer—and Ambassador Vershbow should
note—Karimov had essentially called on his SCO partners to make a choice
between siding with the United States "or with our neighbors in Russia
and China."
Is the Cold War Back?
The growing uneasiness in Central Asia about the United States' missionary zeal
of establishing democracy and human rights, coupled with use of its military
might to keep domination over the world, which resulted in the SCO declaration,
has been noticed by the old cold warriors and the American geo-politicians.
Dr. Michael Weinstein, writing for the Power and Interest News Report, said
the overall strategic aim of the alliance for Beijing and Moscow is curbing
Washington's influence in Central Asia in order to establish a joint sphere
of influence there. For Beijing, the most important goal is to get a lock on
the considerable energy resources of the region, but it also seeks markets for
its goods, outlets for investment, and collaboration against Islamist movements.
Moscow has leagued with Beijing in order to restore some of its influence over
its "near abroad," Weinstein said.
On July 12, the Washington Post carried a front-page article, "Cold War
Rivalry Reviving in Central Asia," which made clear that the United States
will lean heavily on Uzbek President Islam Karimov, to keep its presence in
Central Asia. The article said the stakes are high, since the United States
has relied on the Uzbek base at Karshi-Khanabad, known as K-2, for military
and humanitarian missions in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, which was one of the first
republics to ask Russian troops to leave after the Soviet Union collapsed, reflects
new U.S. influence in Central Asia.
What also bothers the Bush Administration hawks is that the SCO declaration
for the closure of U.S. military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, that now
support Washington's operations in Afghanistan, will also put a monkey-wrench
in the Pentagon's strategy of creating a permanent arc of bases spanning East
Africa and East Asia.
With so much to lose, the Washington Post article indicated that the Bush Administration
is now completing plans for an overture to President Islam Karimov, possibly
beginning with a Cabinet-level emissary going to Tashkent to be followed by
a telephone call from Bush—if Karimov is open to an international inquiry
into the May 13 unrest in Andijan.
The article, quoting Martha Brill Olcott of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, noted that at the SCO summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin called
for increased regional security cooperation. "Russia is trying to take
advantage of the situation that the Bush Administration's democracy policy has
opened for them—to increase the reliance of Central Asian states on Russia,"
Olcott said.
It has also been reported in the Washington Post that Beijing has called on
Washington to honor the request for U.S. troops to withdraw from Central Asia.
"It's China going on record and using Russia's shared frustration in Central
Asia to say that the U.S. global agenda is one that China is not willing to
sign onto," Olcott added.
What the American geopoliticians have assiduously avoided so far is the Indian
interest in what the SCO has announced. India, along with Pakistan and Iran,
sought and was granted observer status in the SCO at the summit. Indian External
Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh was quite busy meeting heads of state in Astana.
The presence of India in Astana is an acknowledgment of the organization's growing
geo-strategic importance.
Uzbek President Islam Karimov undertook a three-day trip to New Delhi, April
4-6, to conduct negotiations with the Indian government and to sign 12 agreements
with India. These accords ranged over such diverse fields as defense, education,
trade, industry, tourism, and the struggle against terrorism. But undoubtedly
the defense, anti-terrorism, and economic agreements were the most important
results of this trip. Interestingly, this was Karimov's third visit to India,
and the latest trip was Karimov's recognition of India's growing interest in,
and capabilities toward, Central Asia.
The Indian Factor
India has made no bones of its interest in Central Asia and is keen to expand
its influence and presence there. It perceives the region as a major source
of its energy needs, not to mention other raw materials. Therefore, since 2000,
India's governments have steadily expanded contacts with Central Asian regimes
and vigorously pursued New Delhi's interests in access to trade, energy, and
even military bases, as in Tajikistan's case. India has won Karimov's assent
to participate in the exploration of oil and gas reserves in Uzbekistan. Both
sides also agreed on the importance of quickly realizing an international transport
corridor through Afghanistan so that goods could move more quickly between their
states.
A senior Indian diplomat, K. Gajendra Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Turkey,
pointed out recently that the SCO, originally established to counter Islamic
terrorism, is composed of militarily powerful states like Russia, China, and
India. He observed that "the galloping Chinese and Indian economies, the
energy-based economic recovery in Russia with its immense reserves, and in other
SCO members and observers, could develop into an economic challenge to a U.S.
economy addicted to reckless deficits at home and in external trade, and a stagnant
and confused European Union."
However, it would be naive to believe that the Bush Administration, which has
a proclivity to be reckless and overtly confrontational, will let the SCO have
its way. Besides using the lure of financial grants and cheap credit, Washington
will use a number of weapons it has in its arsenal.
U.S. Retaliation
On July 14, U.S. Rep. Christopher Smith (R-N.J.), said that the Central Asia
Democracy and Human Rights Act (CADHRA) of 2005 would link the provision of
any non-humanitarian aid to a certification from the U.S. President that a country
was making "substantial, sustained, and demonstrable progress toward democratization
and full respect for human rights."
"After almost 15 years of independence, the five countries of Central
Asia are still struggling in their transition to democracy," Smith said.
For every year that certification was not granted, aid would be reduced by
one-third, he said. In the third year, aid would be completely cut off unless
the President made an exception and restored one-third on national security
grounds. Under the proposed bill, a country would be able to requalify for assistance
once it received certification, while withheld aid would be reallocated to nongovernmental
organizations and other entities that support democracy....