Untitled Document
For more than two decades, arms control experts have argued that the most
likely scenario for the hostile use of nuclear weapons was not between the former
Cold War superpower rivals, an act of terrorism by an underground terrorist group,
or the periodically threatened unilateral U.S. attack against a “rogue state,”
but between India and Pakistan.
These two South Asian rivals have fought each other in three major wars –
in 1947, 1965, and 1971 – and have engaged in frequent border clashes in
recent years in the disputed Kashmir region, coming close to another all-out war
as recently as 2002.
It is ironic, then, that President George W. Bush – who reiterated in the
2004 presidential campaign that his primary concern was the proliferation of nuclear
materials – is actively pursuing policies which will like increase the risk
of a catastrophic nuclear confrontation on the Indian subcontinent.
THE UNTIED STATES AND INDIA
On July 18, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, President
Bush announced his intention to provide India access to sensitive nuclear technology
and sophisticated nuclear-capable weapons systems. The agreement does not require
India to eliminate its nuclear weapons program or its ballistic missile systems,
as called for by a 1998 UN Security Council resolution, or to even cease production
of weapons-grade plutonium which enables India to further expand its arsenal
of more than three dozen nuclear warheads.
Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, called
the agreement on the transfer of the dangerous technology as “the high-water
mark of U.S.-India relations” since the country’s independence from
Great Britain in 1947. It is demonstrative of the Bush administration’s
view of foreign relations that the transfer of such dangerous technology is
seen as of greater positive significance than the critical agricultural assistance
and food aid the United States provided India in the 1960s which not only prevented
an incipient famine of mass proportions but significantly boosted India’s
long-term agricultural development, thereby saving untold millions of lives.
Former Senator and 1972 Democratic presidential nominee George McGovern, who
helped oversee such foreign aid programs to India when he served as director
of the Food for Peace program in the Kennedy administration, called Burns’
statement “a dangerous misunderstanding of how American can best use foreign
aid in support of economic development and international security.”
In order for the proposed U.S.-Indian agreement to be implemented, the Bush
administration will need Congress to amend the U.S. Non-Proliferation Act, which
bans the transfers of sensitive nuclear technology to any county which refuses
to accept international monitoring of its nuclear facilities. It will also mean
contravening the rules of the 40-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls
the export of nuclear technology and to which the United States is a signatory.
It would also be a violation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
has been signed and ratified by the United States, which calls on existing nuclear
powers to not transfer nuclear know-how to countries which have not signed the
treaty.
This proposed agreement would actually endanger India’s security by encouraging
a dangerous nuclear weapons program that award-winning Indian novelist Arundhati
Roy has referred to as “the final act of betrayal by a ruling class that
has failed its people.”
In the best-case scenario, in which U.S. nuclear assistance was somehow limited
solely to peaceful uses, it would still be bad for India. Even advanced industrialized
countries have found nuclear power to be an extremely dangerous and expensive
means of electrical generation. As evidenced by the 1984 accident at a Union
Carbide chemical facility in the Indian city of Bhopal, which killed more than
20,000 people, there are serious questions regarding the ability of Indian authorities
to adequately safeguard the public from industrial accidents.
India’s interests in procuring additional nuclear technology is ironic,
given that the man who led the country’s freedom struggle from British
colonialism, Mohandas Gandhi, was not only a pacifist and an opponent of the
partition of his country between India and Pakistan, but was also an opponent
of centralized control – whether it be by the state or private corporations
– of basic necessities like energy. Were he alive today, Gandhi would
not only be leading the struggle against the proposed U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement,
he would be an outspoken advocate of small-scale locally-controlled renewable
energy and other appropriate technologies, such as solar power.
India ranks 118 th out of 164 countries on the United Nations Development Program’s
Human Development Index, ranking below even the impoverished nations of Central
America. More than 400 million Indians are illiterate, more than 600 million
lack even basic sanitation and more than 200 million have no safe drinking water.
Surely, if promoting “sustainable development” in India is really
the goal, as President Bush claims, there are certainly better ways to do that
than building nuclear power plants.
The United States and Pakistan
The Bush administration’s announcement in early May that it intended
to sell sophisticated F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan also raises serious questions
regarding its stated commitment to promote democracy, support non-proliferation,
and fight terrorism and Islamic extremism.
Unlike India, which – despite its enormous social and economic inequality
and ethnic diversity – has nurtured a longstanding democratic political
system, Pakistan has been ruled primarily by a series of military dictatorships.
General Pervez Musharraf, who overthrew Pakistan’s democratically-elected
government in 1999, continues to suppress the established secular political
parties while allowing for the development of Islamic political groups that
demonstrate little regard for individual freedom. Despite this, Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice, who visited Pakistan in March as part of her world tour
supposedly promoting democracy, had little but kind words for the Musharraf
dictatorship. While acknowledging that he has yet to restore constitutional
governance, she praised his willingness to consider holding elections some time
in 2007.
Under Musharraf’s rule, Pakistan has one of the lowest education budgets
relative to GDP than any country on the globe, resulting in the collapse of
what was once one of the developing world’s better educational systems.
This lack of adequate public education has led to the rise of Saudi-funded Islamic
schools, known as madrasahs, many of which have served as recruiting grounds
for terrorists. The Congressional Research Service, in a report this past December,
noted how – despite promises to the contrary – Musharraf has not
cracked downed on the more extremist madrasahs. Meanwhile, in contrast to the
$3 billion worth of armaments the U.S. government is eager to send to promote
the Pakistani government’s war-fighting capability, the Bush administration
is only offering $67 million in foreign aid for Pakistani education.
An administration official has claimed that the U.S. fighter-bombers “are
vital to Pakistan’s security as President Musharraf prosecutes the war
on terror.” However, these jets were originally ordered fifteen years
ago, long before the U.S.-led “war on terror” began. Their delivery
was halted by the administration of the current president’s father out
of concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program and the Pakistani military’s
ties with Islamic terrorist groups. Such sophisticated aircraft are not particularly
effective in attacking a decentralized network of underground terrorist cells
located in remote tribal areas of that country, where small-unit counter-insurgency
operations would be far more effective.
The other factor the administration and its supporters fail to mention is that,
for more than a decade, Pakistan actively supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
which provided sanctuary for the al-Qaeda network. Osama bin Laden and his senior
aides are widely believed to have been living in Pakistan for the past three
and a half years.
One of the most disturbing aspects of U.S. support for the Pakistani regime
is that Pakistan has been sharing its nuclear materials and know-how with North
Korea and other so-called “rogue states.” The Bush administration
has chosen to essentially ignore what has been called “the most extravagantly
irresponsible nuclear arms bazaar the world has ever seen” and to instead
blame others.
For example, even though it was actually Pakistanis who passed on nuclear materials
to Libya, the Bush administration instead told U.S. allies that North Korea
was responsible, thereby sabotaging negotiations which many had hoped could
end the North Korea’s nuclear program and resolve that festering crisis.
Though it was Pakistan which provided Iran with nuclear centrifuges, the Bush
administration is now citing Iran’s possession of such materials as justification
for a possible U.S. military attack against that country.
The Bush administration, despite evidence to the contrary, claims that the
Pakistani government was not responsible for exporting such dangerous materials,
but that these serious breaches of security was solely the responsibility of
a single rogue nuclear scientist name Abdul Qadeer Khan. Unfortunately, the
Pakistani military regime has not allowed U.S. intelligence access to Khan,
the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program, who lives under government
protection in Islamabad.
Encouraging a Regional Arms Race
The Bush administration has tried to assuage concerns of India over its transfer
of such military aircraft to Pakistan by promising that they too would be able
to receive the sophisticated warplanes, which are nuclear-capable. It is not
unreasonable to expect that, out of a similar interest in “balance,”
the Bush administration may support the transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan
as well. The result of such policies will almost certainly be a renewed and
increasingly dangerous nuclear arms race.
Pakistan and India are among only a handful of nations which have refused to
sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and both already possess nuclear
weapons. U.S. law prohibited the United States from sending arms to Pakistan
and India as a result of their nuclear weapons programs, but President Bush
– with bipartisan Congressional support – successfully had such
restrictions overturned in 2001.
In 1998, the UN Security Council – with U.S. support – passed resolution
1172, which called on Pakistan and India to eliminate their nuclear weapons
and their ballistic missiles. Yet you do not hear anyone in the administration
or virtually anyone in Congress ever mentioning this important resolution.
The Bush administration, with the support of both Republican and Democratic
leaders in Congress, tried to justify its 2003 decision to invade Iraq on the
grounds that the Iraqi government would not abide by UN Security Council resolutions
demanding that it rid itself of weapons of mass destruction, WMD programs, and
offensive delivery systems. The fact that the Iraqi government had already done
so and had even allowed UN inspectors unfettered access to verify that it had
disarmed as required did not stop this bipartisan determination that the United
States somehow had the right to take over that oil-rich country to deal with
this supposed “threat.”
By contrast, Pakistan and India – unlike Iraq in 2003 – not only
has an active nuclear weapons program, it has built, tested, and amassed a stockpile
of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles. Pakistan and India, unlike
Iraq in 2003, are in open defiance of the UN Security Council’s insistence
that they disarm these weapons and delivery systems.
The Bush administration and Congressional leaders, however, appear to believe
that nuclear proliferation and violations UN Security Council resolutions should
only be of concern if the government in question is one that the U.S. government
does not like.
For more than a decade, the U.S. government has forcefully challenged Russia
not to provide nuclear technology to Iran, even though the Russian-Iranian nuclear
agreements have had more stringent safeguards than the proposed U.S.-Indian
nuclear agreement. Indeed, unlike India, there is no solid evidence that Iran
even has a nuclear weapons program, much less nuclear weapons themselves.
Rather than get serious about discouraging non-proliferation, the Bush administration
– with the support of a bipartisan majority in Congress – appears
instead to insist on a kind of nuclear apartheid, where the United States alone
gets to decide who can have these dangerous weapons and who cannot.
Not only do such policies undermine international arms control agreements and
are contrary to basic principles of fair play, any arms control regime based
upon such double-standards unilaterally imposed from the outside is bound to
lead to increased efforts by the have-nots to join the ranks of the already-haves.
The best hope for genuine peace and security in the region would be through
the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone for all of South and Southwest
Asia, similar to those which already exist in Southeast Asia, Latin America,
Africa, and the South Pacific. Unfortunately, a proposed UN Security Council
resolution in December 2003 calling for the establishment of such an additional
nuclear-free zone was withdrawn after a threatened United States veto.
Maintaining such double-standards regarding nuclear proliferation not only
presents incalculable dangers to regional and global peace and security, but
they are simply not worthy of a country which asserts the right to global leadership.