Untitled Document
Are U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons deployed in the Persian Gulf, on hair-trigger alert,
and ready to be launched against Iran at a moment's notice?
The answer is contained in presidential
directive NSPD 35, "Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization,"
issued May 2004, which is classified. Nevertheless, we can infer the answer
from the fact that every other element needed for a nuclear strike on Iran is
now "deployed" and ready, namely:
The nuclear hitmen: Stephen Hadley, Stephen Cambone, Robert Joseph, William
Schneider Jr., J.D. Crouch II, Linton Brooks, and John Bolton are nuclear-weapons
enthusiasts who advocate aggressive policies and occupy key positions
in the top echelons of the Bush administration.
A nuclear doctrine that advocates nuclear strikes against non-nuclear countries
that precisely
fit the Iran profile: the "Nuclear
Posture Review" and the "Doctrine
for Joint Nuclear Operations."
The doctrine of preemptive
attack adopted by the Bush administration and already put into practice
in Iraq, and the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(NSPD 17),
which promises to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons.
150,000 American soldiers in Iraq, whose lives are at risk if a military
confrontation with Iran erupts, and who thus provide the administration with
a strong argument for the use of nuclear weapons to defend them.
Americans' heightened state of fear of terrorist attacks and their apparent
willingness to support any course of action that could potentially protect
them from real or imagined terrorist threats.
The allegations of involvement of Iran in terrorist activities around the
world [1],
[2], including
acts against America [1], [2],
and its alleged
possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The determination of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission that Iran
has connections with al-Qaeda.
Senate Joint Resolution 23, "Authorization
for Use of Military Force," which allows the president "to take
action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States"
without consulting Congress, and the War
Powers Resolution [.pdf], which "allows" the president to attack
anybody in the "global
war on terror."
The Bush administration's willingness to use military power based on unconfirmed
intelligence and defectors'
fairy tales.
The fact that Iran has been declared
in noncompliance [.pdf] with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which
makes it "legal"
for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran.
The course
of action followed by the Bush administration with respect to Iran's
drive for nuclear technology, which can only lead to a diplomatic
impasse.
The Israel factor [1],
[2] .
I have discussed many of these elements in previous
columns. Here I will focus on the people, the doctrine, and the weapons.
Nuclear Hitmen
The decision to employ nuclear weapons at any level in a military conflict
rests with the president. Neither Congress nor state governments nor you nor
I have to be consulted. According to Robert McNamara (U.S. secretary of defense
during the Cuban missile crisis), to launch a nuclear attack requires "20
minutes' deliberation by the president and his advisers."
In preparation for the nuclear strike on Iran, the Bush administration in its
second term has deployed into key positions hardliners that have both expertise
in nuclear weapons and a known history of advocating the aggressive use thereof.
Thus the president can say, "I
feel like I'm getting really good advice from very capable people"
to justify nuking Iran.
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
Hadley is one of
the coauthors of the document "Rationale
and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf],
which served as a blueprint for the " Nuclear
Posture Review" of 2001. In a 1997 paper, "Policy
Considerations in Using Nuclear Weapons," Hadley applauded the "many
men and women" who "have devoted their professional lives" to
nuclear weapons as having made "a significant contribution to our nation."
Further, "It is often an unstated premise in the current debate that if
nuclear weapons are needed at all, they are needed only to deter the nuclear
weapons of others. I am not sure this unstated premise is true … this
is not why we got into the nuclear business." He was one of the leading
proponents of the claim that Iraq
had a nuclear weapons program, and he was profiled in a 2004 Los Angeles
Times article as "A
Hawk in Bush's Inner Circle Who Flies Under the Radar."
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone
Cambone is Rumsfeld's
right-hand man, another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements,"
and a longtime promoter of missile-defense systems. If there is any doubt as
to whether he will promote the policies advocated in that document, let's hear
his own words: "Any policymaker has certain views. Policymakers are where
they are and doing what they do because they have a view." (New
York Times, April 11, 2003)
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
Robert Joseph
Joseph has the position
formerly held by John Bolton
and is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He also helped
draft the document "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction"
(NSPD-17), which advocates
the use of nuclear weapons in response to WMD and names Iran as one of the countries
that are the focus of the new U.S. strategy. He is a member of the National
Institute for Public Policy, which says on
its Web page that Joseph is a leading promoter of counterproliferation policy
("formulation and implementation of national security strategies to counter
proliferation threats") and "criminalizing proliferation activities."
He was the National Security
Council member supervising the portion of the 2003 State of the Union speech
dealing with intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According
to Right Web, Joseph
"advocates the offensive
use of nuclear weapons" and advocates placing "preemptive attacks
and weapons of mass destruction at the center of U.S. national security strategy."
In
a recent interview, Joseph "dismissed Iran's contention it seeks only
civilian nuclear power," said that "Iran is closing in on production
of nuclear weapons and even UN sanctions may not deter the aggressive government
in Tehran," and averred that "once they begin to enrich, that is the
point of no return," echoing similar
statements by Israeli officials.
National Nuclear Security Administration Director Linton Brooks
Brooks oversees
the country's nuclear weapons infrastructure and is another coauthor of "Rationale
and Requirements." He also served on the Pentagon's Deterrence
Concepts Advisory Panel, which was charged with overseeing the production
of the Nuclear Posture Review policy document. In explaining the Nuclear Posture
Review to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2004, Brooks
stated [.pdf]:
"The Nuclear Posture Review represented a radical departure from the
past and the most fundamental rethinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear
weapons in almost a quarter-century. … Instead of treating nuclear weapons
in isolation, it considered them as an integrated component of American military
power. … Instead of treating the future as static and predictable, it
recognized that requirements could change and that U.S. nuclear forces must
be prepared to respond to those changes, including by increasing the fraction
of the force that is deployed. … The Nuclear Posture Review broadens
our thinking to encompass a New Triad of flexible response capabilities consisting
of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities."
In that address, he also advocated research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
initiative to "hold at risk hardened, deeply buried facilities that may
be important to a future adversary," and repealing
the prohibition on low-yield
nuclear weapons to allow research in "advanced concepts" of more
usable nuclear weapons. He stated,
"We need to make sure our weapons will in fact be seen by other countries
as a deterrent. One element of that is usability. If nobody believes there is
any circumstance where you will use the weapon, it is not a deterrent."
Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board William Schneider
Jr.
Schneider is another
coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He
was a staff member at the Hudson Institute between 1967 and 1971, where
"he
contributed to studies on strategic forces, Soviet affairs, theater nuclear
force operations, and arms control." In
his own words, "The leakage of nuclear weapons-design technology over
time has become a flood in recent years," and "Both Iran and Iraq
sought to develop their own military ballistic and cruise missiles as well as
weapons of mass destruction. In conjunction with offshore procurements of conventional
defense products, they produced formidable military establishments posing an
overwhelming threat to U.S. allies."
Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch II
Crouch served as
assistant secretary of defense from 2001 to 2003, and was
the "principal advisor to the secretary of defense on the formulation
and coordination of policy … for nuclear forces, missile defense, technology
security policy, counterproliferation, and arms control." In a briefing
he gave on the Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, he
stated, "Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives. One
would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against
deep and hardly – or hard targets and deeply-buried targets." He
is characterized as a "nuclear
weapons enthusiast."
Conclusion? None of these people, when asked for advice, is likely to advise
against the use of nuclear weapons for reasons that you or I would
find eminently reasonable [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5].
Finally, there is the infamous
John Bolton. While
undersecretary of state, he warned
that "efforts to attain nuclear weapons pose a direct and undeniable threat
to the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Whether the
nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats
today, or threats tomorrow, there can be no dispute that our attention is required
now before the threats become reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians,
or more, have been vaporized." Concerning Iran specifically, he
stated that "Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical
weapons," that "Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program,"
and in this connection that the "risks to international peace and security
from such programs are too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity."
Concerning missiles, he said, "Iran continues its extensive efforts to
develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction," and just
like his successor, he stated categorically that "Iran
has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons." Today, John
Bolton is "deployed" as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, where
he will be most effective (simply cutting and pasting from his old speeches)
explaining to the world why a nuclear strike on Iran was necessary.
Note that there is no obvious reason why the national security advisor, the
deputy national security advisor, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence,
the chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board, and the U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations have to be people with experience in nuclear weapons policy.
This was not the case in other administrations. That it is the case in this
administration is highly unlikely to be a coincidence. Instead, it gives a strong
indication that it was envisioned in advance that the use of nuclear weapons
would be a central theme of the second term of the Bush administration.
Doctrine Deployment
The Bush administration has been busy in recent years "deploying"
the doctrine that will underpin the upcoming nuclear strike against Iran. Some
of this deployment occurred through presidential
speeches, some through unclassified policy documents, and some through classified
documents, parts of which were "leaked." It has been a well-orchestrated
process with a clear purpose: that the more alert sectors of the public and
policymakers,
and in particular the arms control community,
become fully aware of it, so that when nuclear weapons are used it does not
come as a total surprise. At the same time, the mainstream media have provided
little coverage on the radical change in the nuclear weapons doctrine (a few
articles in the New
York Times and Washington
Post), so the issue has remained largely invisible to the general public.
The National Security Strategy
of the United States of America of September 2002 codifies the doctrine
of preemptive attacks, with phrases such as
"We cannot let our enemies strike first…"
"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and
objectives of today's adversaries…"
"[E]ven if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's
attack…"
"[T]he United States cannot remain idle while danger gathers…"
This doctrine was
used with Iraq and will
be used next with Iran.
The National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states, "The United States will
continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming
force – including potentially nuclear weapons – to the use of WMD
against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."
The Nuclear
Posture Review delivered to Congress in 2001 is classified, but portions
have been made public. It substantially broadens the role of nuclear weapons
from their traditional role as deterrents against nuclear countries to encompass
non-nuclear "rogue" nations. It states that "U.S. nuclear forces
will now be used to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs
or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends,"
and that "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand
non-nuclear attack."
The Doctrine
for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] is the Pentagon's implementation of
the new nuclear posture. According to Hans
Kristensen's analysis, "Foremost among the doctrine's new features
[is] the incorporation of preemption into U.S. nuclear doctrine…."
It lists a variety of new conditions
under which nuclear weapons will be used, including, "For rapid and favorable
war termination on U.S. terms," "To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability
to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD," and against "An
adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance
forces or civilian populations."
The " Rationale
and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf] was
produced by the National Institute for Public
Policy and served as a basis for the Nuclear Posture Review. Furthermore,
five of its authors are in key positions in the administration today as discussed
above, and as a consequence, the contents of this document are likely to reflect
also the views of these policymakers and forecast the future actions of the
administration. Statements in this document include:
"[A] counterforce strategy will entail more targets, including many
that are harder to find and are better protected…"
"[A] larger number of weapons, weapons with varied characteristics
and greater accuracy, will be needed for a counterforce strategy…"
"Hardened targets built underground and deeply buried facilities are
the most difficult to destroy and will influence the required number and characteristics
of nuclear weapons…"
"Examples of hardened and buried targets include missile silos, launch
control centers, concrete aircraft shelters, deeply buried command posts,
tunnels for missile storage and assembly, storage bunkers, and underground
facilities for weapons research and production…"
"For example, although conventional weapons could be used to attack
the entrances, exits, or 'umbilicals' – electrical power, air supply,
and communications links – of a deeply buried facility, one or more
nuclear weapons might be required to destroy the facility itself…"
"To ensure that enemy facilities or forces are knocked out and cannot
be reconstituted, attacks with nuclear weapons may be necessary. Indeed, in
the future the United States may need to field simple, low-yield, precision-guided
nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground
biological weapons facilities."
In summary, the doctrines proclaimed by the administration envision preemptive
nuclear attacks on enemy facilities suspected of harboring WMD and other "assets
most valued" by the enemy.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment
It is generally believed that the U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed
only in Western Europe, remnants of the Cold War. According to Hans
Kristensen of the Nuclear Information Project:
"The 480 bombs deployed in Europe represent more than 80 percent of
all the active B61 tactical bombs in the U.S. stockpile. No other U.S. nuclear
weapons are forward-deployed (other than warheads on ballistic missile submarines)."
[.pdf]
According to Kristensen, the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Presidential
Directive (NSPD 35) merely
"authorizes
the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe."
However, Kristensen himself states that the new Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations
calls "for
maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike
adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), preemptively if necessary."
The reasons listed above make it essentially certain that NSPD 35 authorizes
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, and it is likely
that such deployment has already occurred and that the weapons are there for
the specific purpose of targeting Iran. The U.S. had tactical
nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea for many years to defend against
a massive conventional North Korean attack. It is easy to argue that an invasion
of southern Iraq by a 9-million
strong Iranian Basij militia reacting to Israel's
bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities cannot be stopped without nuclear weapons.
The following statements in the Doctrine
for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] suggest that tactical nuclear weapons
have been already deployed and are ready to be used, given that "all
options are on the table" with respect to Iran and that many of Iran's
facilities are underground:
"Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient
use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options
to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear
forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy.
This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage,
and reduce the probability of escalation."
"Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors
to determine how to defeat individual targets. … 1. Time sensitivity.
2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target.
4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level
of damage."
"Nuclear weapons and associated systems may be deployed into theaters,
but combatant commanders have no authority to employ them until that authority
is specifically granted by the president."
"Deployed nuclear-strike capabilities include … theater-based,
nuclear-capable dual-role aircraft."
"Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a greater degree of flexibility in
escalation control because they may be a highly visible sign of resolve and,
once ordered to conduct a nuclear strike, are recallable, if necessary. Aircraft-delivered
weapons also provide strike capability across the range of nuclear operations."
The F-16
fighter planes, of which there are many deployed
in Iraq and surrounding American bases, are such dual-role
aircraft, capable of delivering B61-11
earth-penetrating nuclear
bombs.
The Public Has a right to know
It is likely that the administration has briefed key senators (e.g., John Warner,
John McCain, Carl Levin, Dianne
Feinstein, Joe Lieberman) on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons
in the Persian Gulf as
classified information, arguing that it is necessary to protect American
troops in Iraq against an unprovoked Iranian attack, and the American people
from a possible terrorist attack with WMD sponsored by Iran, and that making
the information public could endanger American forces in Iraq or make a terrorist
attack more likely.
However, the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is a grave decision
that affects every man, woman, and child in America (not to mention the rest
of the world). The American public has a right to know if its government has
deployed nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf targeting Iran, because given the
circumstances described above, it
is highly likely that those weapons will be used. The administration has
created the
circumstances to make it appear that the upcoming use of nuclear weapons
against Iran will be "unavoidable." The most likely (though not
the only) scenario is that Israel
will "pull the trigger," bombing some Iranian facilities, and
that the U.S.
will be dragged into the conflict to protect American, Iraqi, and Israeli
lives. The use of low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy underground Iranian facilities
and deter an Iranian response will appear to be the most "humane"
path to achieve U.S. goals of eliminating Iran's nuclear program and destroying
its military capabilities, minimizing casualties, and achieving "rapid
and favorable war termination on US terms."
The American public and the rest of the world will not fall for this deception.
The circumstances surrounding the nuking of Iran were
created with the specific intent of making the use of nuclear weapons by
the U.S. "unavoidable." The real
purpose of nuking Iran is to establish the credibility
of U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any undesirable action by
"rogue" states.
If Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the other nuclear hitmen are really convinced
that this is the best course of action for America, they should make their case
public now. The president should tell the American people that the exercise
of "all
options" against Iran will include nukes. He should allow for a democratic
debate on the pros and cons of using nuclear weapons in the Iran situation,
and on pursuing alternative courses of action, before it is too late.
The president was not elected on an agenda
of nuking
a non-nuclear country, and the radical views of the nuclear hitmen are not
likely to be the views of the majority of Americans.
If the president engages in the use of nuclear weapons against Iran in the
coming weeks or months, without disclosing the preparations to the American
public, he will be making a mockery of the most fundamental democratic principles
that America represents. And he will have provided clear evidence of duplicitous
intent, no matter how many eloquent speeches
he delivers afterwards.