ECONOMICS - LOOKING GLASS NEWS | |
Autoworkers' lives go from bad to worse |
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by Daniel Howes The Detroit News Entered into the database on Friday, October 07th, 2005 @ 18:34:58 MST |
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It's come to this for Detroit's autoworkers. To rescue Delphi Corp.
from imminent bankruptcy, the auto parts giant's 24,000 United Auto Workers
members are supposed to take massive wage cuts, benefit givebacks and myriad
concessions that self-respecting union leaders would never accept, much less
ask their members to ratify. That's why Delphi, the former parts unit of General
Motors Corp., could file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy as early as today, according
to union summaries of the ongoing talks and industry sources familiar with the
situation. GM isn't keen to bail out its offspring, nor can the union take the
proffered "deal" and still claim to be a union. Never before have UAW workers been asked to absorb such Draconian cuts -- not
in the dark days of the Chrysler bailout, the oil shocks of the 1970s or the
periodic crunches since. The sickening part for those at Delphi trying to put
in a day's work is that rejecting the demands won't make them go away, because
they're considered "market rate" outside the UAW-Big Three bubble
and are likely to return during a bloody bankruptcy. Whether yours is a union house or a management house, whether your grandpa
was at Ford's Battle of the Overpass in '37 or managed a plant for GM in '87,
the significance of an impending Delphi bankruptcy and GM's parallel talks with
the UAW for health care concessions cannot be overstated. A cornerstone of 20th-century industrial America, whose labor helped vanquish
the Axis powers in World War II and laid the foundation for unparalleled prosperity,
is perilously close to crumbling under the pressure of late-20th-century mismanagement
and 21st-century competition. That's not the only culprit here. UAW President Ron Gettelfinger blames government trade policies, crafted by
Republicans and Democrats alike, as he did again this week in an interview on
WJR-AM (760), as well as currency manipulation by China and Japan. That's all
debatable. He likely wouldn't acknowledge, however, that his union demanded "more,
more, more" -- and often got it -- when its biggest employers increasingly
could not afford it; that labor contracts that pay laid-off people to sit at
home or bar plant closings are increasingly indefensible; that being the undisputed
"gold standard" for industrial workers has long since priced UAW members
out of a competitive market, enabling others to undercut the union almost at
will. Nor would a long procession of auto execs, many of them now reclining in the
retired comfort of million-dollar homes far from gritty Detroit, admit that
they succumbed to short-term expedience too often. Wooed by the "cooperative"
union-management spirit of the '80s and '90s, they mistook labor peace for smart
business decision-making and ceded control of vast portions of their companies
to union leaders whose goals were antithetical to theirs. Paying a painful price The deals those execs cut with the UAW enriched themselves in good times by
keeping the plants running, ensured more good times for hourly workers glad
to reap the Big Three beneficence, and assumed that Detroit's comparative hegemony
of its own market would more or less continue as it had been. Both sides couldn't have been more wrong. So now, 24,000 UAW members are on the verge of being asked to pay a heavy price
because their leaders and the leaders of their company couldn't agree on the
scope of the problem facing them, let alone the solution. "If Delphi filed bankruptcy, (its) proposal ... to the UAW will look better
than the restructuring proposal it submits to the courts," says a union
briefing memo circulated Thursday, the content of which was corroborated by
Delphi officials. "With that package, the UAW member would not be able
to afford a vehicle that our products are assembled into." There's no telling where this looming string of train wrecks will end.
Is a Delphi bankruptcy, any day now? In a GM decision to make unilateral changes to its health care benefits for
UAW members and retirees -- and spark an ugly, market-share killing fight --
if the automaker can't deliver the $1 billion concession package with the union
it wants? In a last-minute GM bailout of Delphi, despite back-channel GM insistence that
none will be forthcoming? Yes, such a deal would ease the union's pain, but
it likely would invite a punishing response from equity and debt markets and
incur the almost-certain wrath of billionaire Kirk Kerkorian, whose 10 percent
stake in the General makes him a formidable obstacle -- or after-the-fact critic
-- to any multibillion-dollar bailout of Delphi. Misjudging reality The early '80s were painful here. The mid- to late '90s were hailed as the new
Golden Age, which it wasn't. September 11 showed that Detroit could "Keep
America Rolling," as GM boasted. But behind the façade of cheap gas, SUV mania and incentive-fueled sales,
the widening cracks in Detroit's automotive foundation were evident to anyone
who had the stomach to look and the honesty to understand what they saw. Profit-rich competitors like Toyota and Honda were claiming more and more market
share, much of it supplied by plants and workers right here in the good ol'
USA. Struggling rivals like Nissan fixed their business, if with the tacit support
of their government. Meanwhile, the financial health of Detroit's two biggest players -- GM and
Ford -- and their former parts units, Delphi and Visteon, weakened. Neither GM nor Ford, considered financially stronger than its crosstown rival,
are in danger of going bust anytime soon. But their debt is rated "junk,"
their North American business strategies are in doubt by outsiders, and their
ability to hold their own in the U.S. market amid high gas prices is uncertain.
Caught in the maw of all these powerful forces are thousands of average workers
who didn't negotiate with management, didn't design the cars they assemble,
didn't devise lame marketing strategies, or didn't instruct their union leaders
to bleed the company dry. If Delphi goes bankrupt, the lawyers will get rich cleaning up the mess. The
execs will still be paid handsomely, even if they lose their bonuses. Salaried
employees, weary from witnessing union members often evade givebacks, will see
health care premiums rise, 401(k) accounts go unmatched and pensions potentially
eviscerated. But it's the looming comeuppance of union members, more than anything else,
that would put a human face on the reckoning that feels nigh. It wasn't supposed
to work out like this. |